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a b s t r a c t
An extended-real-valued function on Rn+ is called logarithmically homogeneous if it is given by the
logarithmic transformation of a homogeneous function onRn+. Specifying a consumer’s preference on the
consumption set by a difference comparison relation, this paper provides some axioms on the relation
under which the full class of utility functions representing the relation are logarithmically homogeneous.
It is also shown that all the utility functions are strongly concave and all the indirect utility functions
are logarithmically homogeneous. Moreover, the additively separable logarithmic utility functions are
derived by strengthening one of the axioms.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
As a utility function exhibiting theMarshallian constancy, that is,
the marginal utility of income depends only on the income levels,
Samuelson (1942, Equation (41)) introduces the following form of
utility function1: a utility function U defined on the consumption
set X = Rn+ is logarithmically homogeneous if and only if there is a
1-homogeneous function2 u on X and two parameters a > 0 and b
such that U(x) = a · log u(x)+ b for all x ∈ X .3
All the logarithmically homogeneous utility functions U are
strongly concave on X under the strict quasi-convexity assump-
tion for the underlying preference orderings and the demand
functions derived from the logarithmically homogeneous utility
functions are 1-homogeneous with respect to prices. Therefore, if
we assume the logarithmically homogeneous utility functions for
the market models in an applied welfare analysis, we can derive
E-mail address:miyake@econ.tohoku.ac.jp.
1 See also Katzner (1967) and Rader (1976). Mantel (1976) andMas-Colell (1985,
page 197) assume the utility functions to prove the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu
theorem in the competitive market model.
2 For a given integer r , a real-valued function f on X is called r-homogeneous if
and only if f is homogeneous of degree r , i.e., f (λ · x) = λr · f (x) for all x ∈ X and
all λ > 0.
3 Since a (typical) indirect utility function corresponding to the logarithmically
homogeneous utility function can bewritten as V (p, I) = α ·log[I/v(p)]+β , where
v is a (−1)-homogeneous function and a α > 0 and β are parameters, it holds that
∂V (p, I)/∂ I = α · [v(p)/I] · [1/v(p)] = α/I , which is the Marshallian constancy.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.08.005
0304-4068/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access art
4.0/).some normative conclusions (such as equity-regarding policy pre-
scriptions) based on the strong concavity, while themarketmodels
with the homogeneous demand functions are simple and compu-
tationally tractable. In particular, an additively separable logarith-
mic utility function U∗(x) = a1 · log x1 + · · · + an · log xn + b
is a logarithmically homogeneous utility function whose (under-
lying) 1-homogeneous function coincides with a Cobb–Douglas
function, and then the competitive equilibria of the market mod-
els with the additively separable logarithmic utilities can be com-
puted using the corresponding Cobb–Douglas demand functions,
d(p, I) = (a1I/p1, . . . , anI/pn).
In the (neoclasical) ordinal utility theory, a utility function
is defined as a numerical indicator representing a consumer’s
preference ordering to explain the consumer’s demand behavior
in the market model, and the utility function is unique up to
the monotone transformations. A characterization theorem of the
representability of a preference ordering by the 1-homogeneous
utility function is given by Katzner (1970, Theorem 2.3-2), who
shows that the preference ordering satisfies the monotonicity,
continuity and homotheticity axioms if and only if there exists
at least one 1-homogeneous utility function representing the
preference ordering.4 Since the logarithmic function is monotone,
it follows from Katzner’s characterization result that the three
axioms above are necessary and sufficient for a preference
4 See also Dow and Werlang (1992), Candeal and Induráin (1995) and Bosi et al.
(2000).
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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utility function. However, this characterization result ensures
not only the existence of a logarithmically homogeneous utility
function but also the existence of some utility functions that
are not logarithmically homogeneous, because the logarithmic
homogeneity of the utility function is not assured for some
monotone transformations, that is, the logarithmic homogeneity is
a cardinal property of the (ordinally determined) utility function.5
As a general rule, a normative conclusion should not be derived
from a specific property of utility function that depends on the
selection of utility function in the welfare/normative analysis,
and then the preference foundation of the utility functions for
the analysis is not well-established by the characterization result
above.6
To avoid this phenomenon that is intrinsic in the ordinal utility
theory, this paper adapts the cardinal utility theory based on
the difference (intensity) comparisons developed by Alt (1936),
Shapley (1975) and others, where a utility function is an indicator
representing a consumer’s absolute welfare levels (in a classical
sense) and is unique up to the positive affine transformations.7
In particular, Shapley (1975) shows that a difference comparison
relation on the positive real-line, R++ satisfies the monotonicity,
continuity, consistency and crossover axioms if and only if there
is a cardinal utility function representing the relation. Miyake
(2014) introduces a new axiom called the homogeneity axiom for
the difference comparison relation on R++ and shows that the
logarithmic utility function u(x) = log x can be characterized by
three axioms:monotonicity, consistency andhomogeneity axioms,
where the former two axioms are introduced by Shapley (1975).
This paper attempts to derive the logarithmically homogeneous
utility function by extending the characterization results above
to the general case where the difference comparison relations
are defined on the n-dimensional, non-negative Euclidean space
Rn+. Concretely, this paper provides a new homogeneity axiom for
the difference comparison relation on Rn+, which is stronger than
not only Katzner’s (1970) homotheticity axiom but also Miyake’s
(2014) homogeneity axiom. Hence there exists a 1-homogeneous
utility function u(x) representing some parts of the relation on
Rn+, and U(x) = log u(x) is a logarithmically homogeneous utility
function representing the relation on the ray {x ∈ Rn+: x1 = x2 =· · · = xn}. Using these facts, we show that the full class of utility
functions representing a difference comparison relation on Rn+ are
logarithmically homogeneous if and only if the relation satisfies
the four mutually independent axioms: monotonicity, continuity,
consistency and homogeneity axioms, where the former three
axioms are given by re-stating Shapley’s (1975) corresponding
axioms on Rn+, respectively.8
5 For the computation of a competitive equilibrium, the ordinal characterization
result can be used towards the justification of logarithmically homogeneous utility
functions, since a competitive equilibrium is determined independent of the
selection of the utility functions.
6 In case of uncertainty, Kaneko (1984, Appendix), Wakker and Zank (1999)
and Köbberling and Wakker (2003) derive the cardinal expected utility functions
representing the intensity comparisons so that all the utility functions satisfy the
expected utility hypothesis, which is crucial for relaxing the common knowledge
assumptions of the non-cooperative bargaining games.
7 For a survey of the cardinal utility theory, see Köbberling (2006) and Hudík
(2014). The growth rate comparison for the transitions of GDP can be recognized
as a typical difference comparison. For example, if the t-year’s annual growth rate
(≡ [GDP(t)−GDP(t−1)]/GDP(t−1)) is greater than t∗-year’s growth rate, then the
transition fromGDP(t−1) to GDP(t) is preferred to the transition fromGDP(t∗−1)
to GDP(t∗). For the growth rate comparison, see Mandelbrot (1960, Section 1.5),
Graff (2014) and Miyake (2014). However, Kaneko (1984) points out a problem
with the method of eliciting the relation behaviorally. For such a methodological
problem, see Köbberling and Wakker (2003, Section 3) and Qin and Shubik (2015).
8 This result implies that the crossover axiom is redundant in the axiomatization
for the logarithmically homogeneous utility function.Moreover, under some axioms (including the quasi-convexity
axiom) for ensuring thewell definedness of a demand function and
indirect utility function, it is shown that the homogeneity axiom
is necessary and sufficient for all the indirect utility functions to
be logarithmically homogeneous, and that the additively separable
logarithmic utility functions are derived by strengthening the
homogeneity axiom only in the axiomatic characterizations
above.9
The characterization results clarify the scope of applicability of
logarithmically homogeneous utility functions. In particular, since
all the logarithmically homogeneous utility functions above are
strongly concave under the quasi-convexity axiom, we can assume
the logarithmic homogeneity condition and the strong concavity
condition for the consumers’ utility functions simultaneously
in the market model, independent of the selections of utility
functions.
The next section introduces the basic definitions and axiomat-
ically derives the logarithmically homogeneous utility function.
Sections 3 and 4 derive the logarithmically homogeneous indi-
rect utility function and the additively separable logarithmic utility
function, respectively.
2. Logarithmically homogeneous utility functions
The consumption set X is defined by X = Rn+. A difference on
X is a transition (path) from a vector x ∈ X to a vector y ∈ X ,
and the difference from x to y is denoted by an ordered pair (x, y).
The set of all admissible differences is defined by Y = {(x, y) :
x ≫ 0},10 where 0 is the origin of X . We identify Y with a subset
of the Euclidean space Rn++ × Rn+ ⊂ R2n, and Y is endowed with
the (relative) Euclidean metric topology. A difference (comparison)
relation on X is a complete and transitive binary relation on Y . The
expression (x, y) % (z,w) means that the transition from x to
y is preferred to the transition from z to w. The symmetric and
asymmetric parts of % are denoted by ∼ and ≻, respectively. A
functionU : X → R∪{− } is called a utility function representing
a difference relation % if and only if
(x, y) % (z,w)⇔ U(y)− U(x) ≥ U(w)− U(z)
for all (x, y), (z,w) ∈ Y .11 (1)
A utility function U representing % is logarithmically homogeneous
if and only if
U is continuously increasing on X , and
U(λ · x) = θ · log λ+ U(x) for all λ > 0
and all x ∈ X with x ≠ 0, (2)
where θ = U(e, . . . , e)− U(1, . . . , 1) > 0.12 Another form of the
definition can be stated as follows: a utility functionU representing
9 The strengthenedhomogeneity axiom is stronger than the stronghomotheticity
axiom (budget-invariance axiom) introduced by Trockel (1989) to characterize the
Cobb–Douglas preferences.
10 Since the value of (−∞)− (−∞) is left undefined in the extended real number
system, we cannot evaluate (0, 0) numerically, and then this restriction on the
domain of % is needed. See Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, Section 1.1) for the
extended real numbers.
11 As the arithmetic rules for the extended real numbers, we assume that a −
(−∞) = −(−∞) > b and (−∞)− a = (−∞) < b for all a, b ∈ R.
12 Condition (2) implies that U(0) = limλ→+0 U(λ, . . . , λ) = limλ→+0[θ ·
log λ + U(1, . . . , 1)] = −∞. Setting x = (1, . . . , 1) and λ = e in (2), we have
U(e, . . . , e) = θ + U(1, . . . , 1), which implies θ = U(e, . . . , e) − U(1, . . . , 1).
This form of definition is standard in the mathematical programming theory. See
Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994). The case of decreasing function is considered in
Section 3 as a form of function dual to (2).
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there is a continuously increasing and 1-homogeneous function
u : X → R+ and a real number µ such that
U(x) = θ · log u(x)+ µ for all x ∈ X, (3)
where θ = U(e, . . . , e) − U(1, . . . , 1) > 0.13 The two definitions
(2) and (3) are equivalent. In fact, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. A utility function U representing % satisfies (2) if and only
if U satisfies (3).
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix B. In order to characterize the
logarithmically homogeneous utility function, we introduce the
axioms:
Monotonicity: x≫ y⇒ (z, x) ≻ (z, y) for all z≫ 0.
Continuity: {(x, y) ∈ Y : (x, y) % (z,w)} and {(x, y) ∈ Y :
(z,w) % (x, y)} are (relatively) closed in Y for all (z,w) ∈ Y .
Consistency: If (z, x) % (z, y) for x, y≫ 0, then (y, z) % (x, z) and
(w, x) % (w, y) for allw≫ 0.
Homogeneity: (x, y) ∼ (λ ·x, λ ·y) for all (x, y) ∈ Y and all λ > 0.
The monotonicity and continuity axioms are standard. The
consistency axiom enables us to derive a binary relation from
%, which can be interpreted as a standard preference ordering.
Formally, for a given difference relation %, a binary relation %′ on
X induced from % is defined by
x%′ y⇔ (z, x) % (z, y) for some z≫ 0 (4)
for x, y ∈ X . The expression x%′ y means that x is preferred to y,
and the binary relation%′ is called the level (comparison) relation of
%. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose that a difference relation % satisfies the mono-
tonicity, continuity and consistency axioms. Then the following asser-
tions hold:
(i) % is Archimedean, that is, (z, x) ≻ (z, y) and w ≫ 0 ⇒
(z, x) ∼ (z, y+ λ ·w) for some λ > 0.
(ii) (z, x) % (z, y)⇒ (w, x) % (w, y) for allw≫ 0.14
(iii) %′ is complete, transitive, monotone and continuous on X.
(iv) x∼′ y ⇒ (z, x) ∼ (z, y) for all z ≫ 0, and x∼′ y ⇒ (z, x) ≻
(z, y) for all z ≫ 0, where ∼′ and ≻′ are the symmetric and
asymmetric parts of %′, respectively.
(v) %′ is Archimedean, that is, x≻′ y and z≫ 0⇒ x∼′ y+λ · z for
some λ > 0.
(vi) If xi∼′ yi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 with x1, y1, x3, y3 ≫ 0, then
(x1, x2) % (x3, x4)⇔ (y1, y2) % (y3, y4).
(vii) x%′ 0 for all x ∈ X.
Lemma 2(ii) implies that if a difference relation % satisfies the
three axioms, the underlying level relation %′ of % is well-defined,
independent of the selection of the reference point z ∈ X in (4).
Lemma 2 is proved in Appendix B.
The homogeneity axiom above requires that if two differences
are indifferent, then the indifference is invariant against the
changes of the unit of consumption goods that are common for
all the goods. Under the three axioms, the homogeneity axiom
implies Katzner’s (1970, Theorem 2.3-2) homotheticity condition,
which requires the indifference relation ∼′ to be scale-invariant.
Further Katzner proves the existence of a 1-homogeneous function
representing the level relation.15 Formally, we have the following
lemma:
13 It holds by (3) thatU(e, . . . , e) = θ · log u(e, . . . , e)+b, and thatU(1, . . . , 1) =
θ · log u(1, . . . , 1) + b. Hence we have U(e, . . . , e) − U(1, . . . , 1) = θ ·
log u(e, . . . , e)/u(1, . . . , 1) = θ · log e = θ . This form of definition is introduced by
Samuelson (1942) and Katzner (1967).
14 Lemma 2(ii) is suggested by the referee.
15 See also Dow and Werlang (1992, Proposition 1.5 and Theorem 1.7), Candeal
and Induráin (1995, Section 4) and Bosi et al. (2000).Lemma 3. Suppose that a difference relation % satisfies the mono-
tonicity, continuity, consistency and homogeneity axioms. Then the
following assertions hold:
(i) %′ is homothetic, that is, x∼′ y⇒ λ · x∼′ λ · y for all x, y ∈ X
and all λ > 0.16
(ii) (α ·e, β ·e) % (γ ·e, δ ·e)⇔ β/α = δ/γ for all a, β, γ , δ ∈ R+
with α, γ > 0, where e ≡ (1, 1, . . . , 1).
(iii) There is a continuously increasing function u∗: X → R+ such
that u∗ is 1-homogeneous and that x%′ y ⇔ u∗(x) ≥ u∗(y)
for all x, y ∈ X .17
(iv) A function u : X → R satisfies all the conditions in
Lemma 3(iii) if and only if there exists α > 0 such that
u(x) = α · u∗(x) for all x ∈ X .
The function u∗ in Lemma 3(iii) is called the 1-homogeneous
function representing %′. The proof of Lemma 3 is given in
Appendix B.
As shown in Fig. 1, the homotheticity condition requires that
a∼′ b ⇒ 2a∼′ 2b, that is, indifference curves are proportionally
expanding, and the homogeneity axiom requires not only this
proportionality property, but also that any two parallel transitions
between the two expansion paths are indifferent such as (a, 2b) ∼
(2a, 4b), by which we can show, using (1) together, that U(2b) −
U(a) = U(4b)−U(2a), that is, the utility differences are invariable
for the two transitions.
It is obvious that the four axioms above hold if there is a loga-
rithmically homogeneous utility function. The following theorem
implies that the four axioms are sufficient for the existence of the
logarithmically homogeneous utility function:
Theorem 1. (A) The following three statements are mutually
equivalent:
(i) A difference relation % satisfies the monotonicity, continuity,
consistency and homogeneity axioms.
(ii) A difference relation % is represented by a logarithmically
homogeneous utility function.
(iii) There is a utility function representing %, and all the utility
functions representing % are logarithmically homogeneous.
Moreover, the utility function representing % is unique up to the
positive affine transformations.
(B) Suppose that a difference relation % satisfies not only all of the
axioms in Assertion (Ai) above but also the quasi-convexity axiom:
Quasi-convexity (quasi-convexity of %′): If (x, y) % (x, z), (x, y∗) %
(x, z), y ≠ y∗ and z≫ 0, then
(x, τ · y+ (1− τ) · y∗) ≻ (x, z) for all τ ∈ (0, 1).18
Then all the utility functions representing % are strongly concave as
well as logarithmically homogeneous.
16 The difference relations derived from the Cobb–Douglas utility functions do
not satisfy our homogeneity axiom, but the Cobb–Douglas level relations satisfy
Katznerś homotheticity axiom. In fact, if U(x1, x2) = (x1x2)1/2 , it holds that
U(y1, y2) − U(x1, x2) = (y1y2)1/2 − (x1x2)1/2 < [(λy1λy2)1/2 − (λx1λx2)1/2] =
U(λy1, λy2) − U(λx1, λx2) for all (y1, y2) ≫ (x1, x2) and all λ > 1, and that
(y1y2)1/2 = (x1x2)1/2 ⇒ (λy1λy2)1/2 = (λx1λx2)1/2 for all λ > 0.
17 Since u∗ is 1-homogeneous, it holds that u∗(2 · 0) = 2 · u∗(0), which implies
u∗(0) = 0. The money-metric utility functions introduced by Weymark (1985)
satisfy all the conditions in Lemma 3(iii).
18 Although the quasi-convexity axiom introduced here is so weak that all the
Cobb–Douglas preference orderings satisfy the axiom, it is sufficient for ensuring
the uniqueness of the demand vector for each price vector.
4 M. Miyake / Journal of Mathematical Economics 67 (2016) 1–9Fig. 1. Indifference map of the level relation.Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix A. Theorem 1(A) implies that
the four axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
logarithmically homogeneous utility function and for all the utility
functions to be logarithmically homogeneous. Moreover, under
all the axioms in Theorem 1(Ai), Theorem 1(A) and (3) together
imply that an extended-real-valued function U on X is a utility
function representing % if and only if there exists α > 0 and β
such that U(x) = α · log u(x) + β for all x ∈ X , where u(x) is
a 1-homogeneous function representing %′ given by Lemma 3(iii).
In particular, it holds by Lemma 3(iv) that the formula: U(x) =
α · log u(x)+ β is well-defined, independent of the selection of u.
All the axioms in Theorem 1(Ai) are mutually independent,
which can be shown by constructing the counter examples. Define
a difference relation %1 by
(x, y)%1(z,w) for all (x, y), (z,w) ∈ Y .
The difference relation %1 satisfies the continuity, consistency and
homogeneity axioms, but it does not satisfy the monotonicity
axiom, which implies that the monotonicity axiom is independent
of the other axioms. Define a difference relation %2 by
(x, y) %2 (z,w)⇔ (y1/x1, y2/x2, . . . , yn/xn)
%′L (w1/z1, w2/z2, . . . , wn/zn) for all (x, y), (z,w) ∈ Y ,
where %L′ is the lexicographic ordering on Rn+.19 Although the
difference relation %2 satisfies the monotonicity, consistency and
homogeneity axioms, it does not satisfy the continuity axiom,
which implies that the continuity axiom is independent. Define a
difference relation %3 by
(x, y) %3 (z,w)⇔ Σi(yi/xi) log[1+ (yi/xi)]
≥ Σi(wi/zi) log[1+ (wi/zi)] for all (x, y), (z,w) ∈ Y .
Then %3 satisfies the monotonicity, continuity and homogeneity
axioms, but it does not satisfy the consistency axiom,20 which
implies that the consistency axiom is independent. Define a
difference relation %4 by
(x, y) %4 (z,w)⇔

i
yi −

i
xi
≥

i
wi −

i
zi for all (x, y), (z,w) ∈ Y .
19 See Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Example 3.C.1, p.46) for the lexicographic ordering.
20 Since ((2, 1, 1, . . . , 1), (2, 3, 1, . . . , 1))≻3((2, 1, 1, . . . , 1), (3, 2, 1, . . . , 1))
and ((1, 2, 1, . . . , 1), (2, 3, 1, . . . , 1))≻3((1, 2, 1, . . . , 1), (3, 2, 1, . . . , 1)),%3
does not satisfy the consistency axiom.Then %4 satisfies the monotonicity, continuity and consistency
axioms, but it does not satisfy the homogeneity axiom, which
implies that the homogeneity axiom is independent.
3. Logarithmically homogeneous indirect utility functions
In the previous section, an extended-real-valued function
U on X is defined to be a utility function representing a
difference relation % if and only if U is order-preserving with
respect to the difference relation %, that is, U satisfies (1) in
Section 2. Accordingly, this section defines the indirect utility
function V derived from the difference relation %, assuming some
axioms on to ensure the well-definedness of the indirect utility
function, and shows that the homogeneity axiom is necessary and
sufficient for all the indirect utility functions to be logarithmically
homogeneous.
Let % be a difference relation on X = Rn+, and let %′ be the
level relation of %. We assume that % satisfies the monotonicity,
continuity, consistency and quasi-convexity axioms on X , which
implies that %′ satisfies the monotonicity, continuity and quasi-
convexity on X . Setting P ≡ Rn++ and I ≡ R1+, the demand
function d : P × I → X can be defined by the unique element
of {x ∈ X : px ≤ I and x%′ y for all y ∈ X with py ≤ I} for each
(p, I) ∈ P× I, where px ≡ p1 · x1+p2 · x2+· · ·+pn · xn. A function
V : P× I→ R ∪ {−∞} is called an indirect utility function of % if
and only if
(d(p, I), d(q, J)) % (d(p∗, I∗), d(q∗, J∗))⇔ V (q, J)− V (p, I)
≥ V (q∗, J∗)− V (p∗, I∗)
for all (p, I), (q, J), (p∗, I∗), (q∗, J∗) ∈ P× Iwith (d(p, I), d(q, J)),
(d(p∗, I∗), d(q∗, J∗)) ∈ Y .
In particular, an indirect utility function V ∗ of % is called
logarithmically homogeneous (with respect to price vectors) if and
only if
there is a continuously decreasing and (−1)-homogeneous
function v∗ : Rn++ ∪ {+∞} → R+
with v∗(+∞) = 0 and two real numbers α > 0 and β
such that V ∗(p, I) = α · log v∗(p1/I, . . . , pn/I)+ β
for all (p, I) ∈ P× I.21 (5)
21 The notation +∞ means (+∞, . . . ,+∞). The budget set at (p, 0) ∈ P × I
coincideswith {0} and d(p, 0) = 0, which implies that V ∗(p, 0) = α ·log v∗(+∞)+
β = −∞ for all p ∈ P.
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homogeneous, it holds that V ∗(λ · p, I) = −α · log λ+ V ∗(p, I) for
all (p, I) ∈ P × I and all λ > 0, which means that the definition
of the logarithmic homogeneity for the indirect utility functions is
consistent to the definition for the direct utility functions given by
(2). The main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let % be a difference relation on X satisfying the
monotonicity, continuity, consistency and quasi-convexity axioms on
X. The following statements are mutually equivalent:
(i) The difference relation % satisfies the homogeneity axiom on X.
(ii) There is a logarithmically homogeneous indirect utility function
of %.
(iii) There is an indirect utility function of %, and all the indirect
utility functions of %, are logarithmically homogeneous on P× I.
Moreover, the indirect utility function of % is unique up to the
positive affine transformations.
Theorem 2 is proved in Appendix A. Theorem 2 implies that the
homogeneity axiom is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
a logarithmically homogeneous indirect utility function and for all
the indirect utility functions to be logarithmically homogeneous
under the monotonicity, continuity, consistency and quasi-
convexity axioms on X . Thus, we can assume a logarithmically
homogeneous indirect utility function as a cardinal function for the
consumer whose difference relation satisfies all the axioms above.
Under all the axioms in Theorem 2, Theorem 2 and (5) together
imply that an extended-real-valued function V on P × I is an
indirect utility function of % if and only if there exists α > 0 and β
such that V (x) = α · log u(d(p, I))+ β for all (p, I) ∈ P× I, where
u is a 1-homogeneous function on X satisfying all the conditions
in Lemma 3(iii). In particular, setting α = 1 and β = 0, a typical
indirect utility function V ∗(p, I) of % can be written as
V ∗(p, I) = log I + log u(d(p, 1)) for all (p, I) ∈ P× I, (6)
whichmeans that the consumer’s cardinal utility values of V ∗(p, I)
can be decomposed into the income part, log I and price part,
log u(d(p, 1)). Alternatively, setting c(p) = 1/u(d(p, 1)) in (6),
another typical indirect utility function V 0(p, I) of% can bewritten
as
V 0(p, I) = log[I/c(p)] for all (p, I) ∈ P× I.
For a consumer satisfying all the axioms above, I/c(p) and c(p) can
be recognized as a normalized income level and a (personalized)
deflator, respectively, since V 0(p, I) is a cardinal indirect utility
function of the consumer. When the price vector is fixed, the
indirect utility function V 0 can be recognized as the logarithmic
utility function on income levels as considered by Mandelbrot
(1960, Section 1.5), Graff (2014) and Miyake (2014).
4. Additively separable logarithmic utility functions
As the utility functions not only exhibit the Marshallian
constancy, but also satisfy the additive separability, Samuelson
(1942, Equation 34) introduces the following form of function: a
function f : X → R ∪ {−∞} is additively separable logarithmic if
and only if there are n+1 real numbers a1 > 0, a2 > 0, . . . , an > 0
and b such that
f (x) = a1 · log x1 + a2 · log x2 + · · · + an · log xn + b
for all x ∈ X .
If a utility function U : X → R ∪ {−∞} representing a preference
% on X is additively separable logarithmic, that is, there are n + 1
real numbers a1 > 0, a2 > 0, . . . , an > 0 and b such that
U(x) = a1 · log x1 + a2 · log x2 + · · · + an · log xn + b
for all x ∈ X,then U is called an additively separable logarithmic utility function.
An indirect utility function V : P × I → R ∪ {−∞} of % is called
additively separable logarithmic on P × I if there are n + 2 real
numbers α0 > 0, α1 < 0, α2 < 0, . . . , αn < 0 (Σαi = −α0)
and β such that
V (p, I) = α0 · log I + α1 · log p1 + α2 · log p2 + · · ·
+αn · log pn + β for all (p, I) ∈ P× I.22
An additively separable logarithmic indirect utility function is
logarithmically homogeneous. In fact, by setting v(t1, . . . , tn) =
tα11 · tα22 . . . tαnn for all (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn++ and v(+∞) = 0, the
function v : Rn++ ∪ {+∞} → R+ is continuously decreasing and
(−1)-homogeneous on Rn++ ∪ {+∞}, and it holds that V (p, I) =
1 · log v(p1/I, . . . , pn/I)+β for all (p, I) ∈ P× I, whichmeans that
V (p, I) satisfies (5).
This section provides an axiomatic characterization theorem
for both forms of utility functions. For the theorem, we need a
definition:
Strong homogeneity: (x, y) ∼ (c ∗ x, c ∗ y) for all (x, y) ∈ Y and
all c≫ 0, where c ∗ x = (c1 · x1, c2 · x2, . . . , cn · xn) ∈ X .
If c1 = c2 = · · · = cn in the statement of the strong homogeneity
axiom, the axiom coincides with the homogeneity axiom, and then
the strong homogeneity axiom is stronger than the homogeneity
axiom. Moreover, the strong homogeneity axiom implies the
strong homotheticity of the level relation, which ensures the
existence of a Cobb–Douglas utility function representing the level
relation. Formally, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. If a difference relation % satisfies the monotonicity,
continuity, consistency and strong homogeneity axioms, then the
following assertions hold:
(i) x∼′ y⇒ c ∗ x∼′ c ∗ y for all c≫ 0, and x%′ y⇒ c ∗ x%′ c ∗ y
for all c≫ 0.
(ii) There is a function w : X → R such that x%′ y ⇔ w(x) ≥
w(y) for all x, y ∈ X and that w(x) = xa11 · · · · · xann
for some n positive numbers: a1 > 0, . . . , an > 0 satisfying
a1 + · · · + an = 1. Moreover, the demand function of %′ is given
by d(p, I) = (a1 · I/p1, . . . , an · I/pn).
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix B. Specifically, in
order to ensure the existence of the Cobb–Douglas utility function
Trockel (1989) introduces Condition (i) in Lemma 4, which is called
the budget invariance axiom. The condition in Lemma 4 requires
the level relations %′ to be coordinate-wisely homothetic, that is,
the indifference relation∼′ of the level relation is invariant against
changes of the units of consumption goods specific to each of the
good, while our strong homogeneity axiom above requires the
difference relation % to be coordinate-wisely homogeneous, that
is, the indifference relation∼ on the differences is invariant against
the changes of the units of consumption goods. The main result of
this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let % be a difference relation on X satisfying the
monotonicity, continuity, consistency and quasi-convexity axioms on
X. The following statements are mutually equivalent:
(i) The difference relation % satisfies the strong homogeneity axiom
on X.
(ii) There is a utility function of % that is additively separable
logarithmic on X.
22 The restrictionΣαi = −α0 is needed, because an indirect utility function must
be 0-homogeneous on P× I.
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Theorem 3 is proved in Appendix A. Suppose that a difference
relation % satisfies all the axioms in Theorem 3, and let w be the
Cobb–Douglas function of%′ in Lemma 4, that is,w(x) = xa11 · · · · ·
xann (a1 > 0, . . . , an > 0 and a1 + · · · + an = 1). Then it holds by
(3) and Theorems 1A and 3 that an extended-real-valued function
U on X is a utility function representing% if and only if there exists
α > 0 and β such that
U(x) = α · (a1 · log x1 + a2 · log x2 + · · · + an · log xn)+ β
for all x ∈ X .
Moreover, it holds by (5) and Theorems 2 and 3 that an extended-
real-valued function V on P × I is an indirect utility function of %
if and only if there exists α > 0 and β such that
V (p, I) = α · [(−a1) · log(p1/I)+ (−a2) · log(p2/I)+ · · ·
+ (−an) · log(pn/I)] + β
= α · [log I − (a1 · log p1 + a2 · log p2 + · · ·
+ an · log pn)] + β for all (p, I) ∈ P× I.
Since (a1 · log p1 + · · · + an · log pn) in the equation above is
called Stone’s price index, Theorem 3 implies that the welfare loss
(costs) due to the price changes should be measured by the index
for the consumerswhosepreferences satisfy the axioms.Moreover,
V (p, I) can be written as
V (p, I) = log(I/pa11 · · · · · pann ) for all (p, I) ∈ P× I.
Hence, if a (representative) consumer satisfies the axioms above,
pa11 · · · · · pann can be recognized as a deflator, because V (p, I) is a
cardinal indirect utility function of the consumer.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. (A) We can prove (iii)⇒ (ii)⇒ (i) easily. We
prove (i)⇒ (ii), and then prove (ii)⇒ (iii).
[(i) ⇒ (ii)]: Suppose a difference relation % satisfies the four
axioms, and let%′ be the level relation of%. It holds by Lemma3(iii)
that there exists a continuously increasing and 1 homogeneous
function u∗ : X → R+ representing %′. Define U∗(x) = log u∗(x)
for all x ∈ X . (U∗(x) = −∞ if u∗(x) = 0. In particular, U∗(0) =
−∞ by u∗(0) = 0.) Then U∗ is logarithmically homogeneous on
X . We show that U∗ is a utility function representing % on X , that
is, U∗ satisfies (1) in Section 2. Denote e ≡ (1, 1, . . . , 1) again, and
fix any (x, y), (z,w) ∈ Y . It holds by Lemma 2(iii, v, vii) that there
are α, β, γ , δ ∈ R+(α, γ > 0) such that
x∼′ α · e, y∼′ β · e, z∼′ γ · e and w∼′ δ · e, (7)
which implies that
u∗(x) = u∗(α · e) = α · u∗(e), u∗(y) = β · u∗(e),
u∗(z) = γ · u∗(e) and u∗(w) = δ · u∗(e). (8)
It holds by (7), Lemma 2(vi), Lemma 3(ii) and (8) that
(x, y) % (z,w) ⇔ (α · e, β · e) % (γ · e, δ · e)⇔ β/α ≥ δ/γ
⇔ β · u∗(e)/α · u∗(e) ≥ δ · u∗(e)/γ · u∗(e)
⇔ u∗(y)/u∗(x) ≥ u∗(w)/u∗(z)
⇔ log u∗(y)− log u∗(x) ≥ log u∗(w)− log u∗(z)
⇔ U∗(y)− U∗(x) ≥ U∗(w)− U∗(z),which implies that U∗(x) is a utility function representing % on X .
[(ii) ⇒ (iii)]: Suppose there is a logarithmically homogeneous
utility function U∗ representing %, and let U be a utility function
representing %. Since [(ii) ⇒ (i)] holds, we can assume that %
satisfies all the axioms in Assertion (Ai) in Theorem 1 and that
U∗(x) = log u∗(x), where u∗(x) is a 1-homogeneous function given
by Lemma 3(iii). We need a lemma:
Lemma 5. If a pair of functions g : R+ → R∪{−∞} and h : R+ →
R∪ {−∞} satisfies g(β)− g(α) ≥ g(δ)− g(γ )⇔ h(β)− h(α) ≥
h(δ)−h(γ ) for all α, β, γ , δ ∈ R++, and if there is a positive number
a∗ > 0 such that h(t) = a∗ · log t for all t ∈ R+, then there exists
a > 0 and b such that g(t) = α · h(t)+ b for all t ∈ R+.
Setting g(t) = U(t · e) and h(t) = U∗(t · e) = [log u∗(e)] · log t for
all t ≥ 0, it holds by Lemma 5 that there exists a > 0 and b such
that
U(t · e) = a · U∗(t · e)+ b for all t ∈ R+. (9)
Fix any x ∈ X . It holds by Lemma 2(v, vii) that there is λ ≥ 0 such
that λ · e∼′ x, which implies that U(λ · e) = U(x) and U∗(λ · e) =
U∗(x). Thuswe have by (9) thatU(x) = U(λ·e) = a·U∗(λ·e)+b =
a·U∗(x)+b, which implies thatU is logarithmically homogeneous.
Hence all the utility functions are logarithmically homogeneous.
Next, we prove that the utility function representing % is unique
up to the positive affine transformations. If U0 and U1 are utility
functions representing %, then it holds by the same argument
above that there exist four numbers, a∗ > 0, b∗, c∗ > 0 and d∗
such that U0(x) = a∗ · U∗(x) + b∗ and U1(x) = c∗ · U∗(x) + d∗
for all x ∈ X . Setting α = (a∗/c∗) and β = −(a∗ · d∗)/c∗ + b∗, we
have that
U0(x) = α · U1(x)+ β for all x ∈ X . (10)
Conversely, if a function U1 represents % and if (10) holds for a
function U0 with two numbers α > 0 and β , then U0 represents%.
(B) Since %′ is strictly quasi-convex, it holds by Friedman (1973)
that the 1-homogeneous function u(x) is weakly concave on X .
Since the logarithmic function is strongly concave,U(x) = log u(x)
is strongly concave on X . 
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (i) first, and then
prove (ii)⇒ (iii)⇒ (ii).
[(i) ⇒ (ii)]: Suppose the difference relation % satisfies the
homogeneity axiom. Let u∗ be a 1 homogeneous function satisfying
all the conditions in Lemma 3(iii). Define a function V ∗ on P× I by
V ∗(p, I) = log u∗(d(p, I)) for all (p, I) ∈ P × I. Since log u∗(x) is
a logarithmically homogeneous utility function representing % on
X , it holds that
(d(p, I), d(q, J)) % (d(p∗, I∗), d(q∗, J∗))
⇔ log u∗(d(q, J))− log u∗(d(p, I))
≥ log u∗(d(q∗, J∗))− log u∗(d(p∗, I∗))
⇔ V ∗(q, J)− V ∗(p, I)
≥ V ∗(q∗, J∗)− V ∗(p∗, I∗)
for all (p, I), (q, J), (p∗, I∗), (q∗, J∗) ∈ P×Iwith (d(p, I), d(q, J)) ∈
Y and (d(p∗, I∗), d(q∗, J∗)) ∈ Y . Hence V ∗ is an indirect util-
ity function of %. Next, we show that V ∗ is logarithmically ho-
mogeneous by proving that v∗(p) ≡ u∗(d(p, 1)) satisfies all the
conditions in (5). Since %′ is continuous and monotone, it holds
by Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Proposition 3.D.3) that v∗(p) is contin-
uously decreasing. We need a lemma:
Lemma 6. [Well-Known, See Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Exercise 3.D.3,
page 97, or Simon and Blume, 1994, Theorem 22.2] d(λ · p, I) =
(1/λ) · d(p, I) and d(p, λI) = λ · d(p, I) for all (p, I) ∈ P× I and all
λ > 0.
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v∗(+∞) = 0, that is,
v∗(λ · p) = u∗(d(λ · p, 1)) = u∗((1/λ) · d(p, 1))
= (1/λ) · v∗(p) for all λ > 0 and all p ∈ P, and
v∗(+∞) = lim
λ→+∞ v
∗(λ · p) = lim
λ→+∞(1/λ) · v
∗(p)
= lim
λ→+∞(1/λ) · u
∗(d(p, 1)) = 0 for all p ∈ P.
Moreover, it holds that V ∗(p, I) = log u∗[d(p, I)] = log u∗[I ·
d(p, 1)] = log u∗[d((1/I)p, 1)] = 1 · log v∗(p1/I, . . . , pn/I) + 0
for all (p, I) ∈ P × I. Thus V ∗ is logarithmically homogeneous on
P× I.
[(ii)⇒ (i)]: Suppose V (p, I) = α ·log v(p1/I, . . . , pn/I)+β(α > 0)
is a logarithmically homogeneous indirect utility function of %. Fix
any λ > 0 and any (x, y) ∈ Y . Since %′ is continuous and (strictly)
quasi-convex, and since x ≫ 0, it holds by Mas-Colell et al. (1995,
Separating Hyperplane Theorem, TheoremM.G.3) that there exists
(p, I) ∈ P × I such that x = d(p, I). Setting e ≡ (1, . . . , 1) again,
define a sequence {ym} by ym = y+ (1/m) · e for allm = 1, 2, . . . ,
which implies limm ym = y and ym ≫ 0 for all m. Since ym ≫ 0,
we can construct a sequence {(qm, Jm)} such that d(qm, Jm) =
ym for all m. Since v(qm1 /J
m, . . . , qmn /J
m) and v(p1/I, . . . , pn/I) are
(−1)-homogeneous, we have that V (qm, λJm) − V (p, λI) = [α ·
log v(qm1 /J
m, . . . , qmn /J
m)+α · log λ]− [α · log v(p1/I, . . . , pn/I)+
α · log λ] = V (qm, Jm) − V (p, I), which implies that (λ · x, λ ·
ym) ∼ (x, ym) for allm. Thus it holds by the continuity axiom that
(λ · x, λ · y) ∼ (x, y).
[(ii) ⇒ (iii)]: Let V ∗ be a logarithmically homogeneous indirect
utility function of %. Since [(ii) ⇒ (i)] holds, % satisfies
the homogeneity axiom. We can assume that V ∗(p, I) =
log u∗(d(p, I)), where u∗ is the 1-homogeneous function in
Lemma 3(iii). Let V be an indirect utility function of %. We show
that V is logarithmically homogeneous. Since {x ∈ X : x%′ e} is
closed and convex, it holds by Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Separating
Hyperplane Theorem, Theorem M.G.3) and Lemma 6 that there
exists a price vector p∗ ∈ P and t∗ > 0 such that t∗ · d(p∗, 1) = e.
Define p0 ∈ P by p0 = (1/t∗) · p∗. Then we have that
d(p0, 1) = d((1/t∗) · p∗, 1) = t∗ · d(p∗, 1) = e.
Define two functions g and h on R+ by g(t) = V (p0, t) and
h(t) = V ∗(p0, t), which implies h(t) = log u∗(d(p0, t)) =
log u∗(t · d(p0, 1)) = [log u∗(e)] · log t . Because g(β) − g(α) ≥
g(δ) − g(γ ) ⇔ V (p0, β) − V (p0, α) ≥ V (p0, δ) − V (p0, γ ) ⇔
V ∗(p0, β)−V ∗(p0, α) ≥ V ∗(p0, δ)−V ∗(p0, γ )⇔ h(β)−h(α) ≥
h(δ)−h(γ ) for allα, β, γ , δ ∈ R++, it holds by Lemma 5 that there
exists a > 0 and b such that
V (p0, I) = a · V ∗(p0, I)+ b for all I ∈ I. (11)
Fix any (p, I) ∈ P × I. It holds by Lemma 2(v, vii) that there is
I0 ∈ I such that d(p0, I0)∼′ d(p, I), which implies that V (p0, I0) =
V (p, I) and V ∗(p0, I0) = V ∗(p, I). Thus we have by (11) that
V (p, I) = V (p0, I0) = a · V ∗(p0, I0)+ b = a · V ∗(p, I)+ b, which
implies that V is logarithmically homogeneous. Hence all the
indirect utility functions of % are logarithmically homogeneous.
If V 0 and V 1 are indirect utility functions of %, then it holds by
almost the same arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 that there
exists α > 0 and β such that
V 0(p, I) = α · V 1(p, I)+ β for all (p, I) ∈ P× I. (12)
Conversely, if V 1 is an indirect utility function of% and if (12) holds
for a function V 0 with two numbers α > 0 and β , then V 0 is an
indirect utility function of %.
[(iii)⇒ (ii)]: Obvious. Proof of Theorem 3. It holds obviously that (ii) ⇒ (i). We prove
(i)⇒ (ii), first.
[(i)⇒ (ii)]: Suppose % satisfies the strong homogeneity axiom. It
holds by Lemma 4(ii) that there exists a Cobb–Douglas function
representing %′, w(x) = xa11 · · · · · xann (a1 > 0, . . . , an >
0, a1+· · ·+an = 1). Define U∗(x) = logw(x) = a1 · log x1+· · ·+
an · log xn for all x ∈ X . Becausew(x) satisfies all the conditions in
Lemma 3(iii), it holds by Theorem 1(A) that% is represented by U∗.
Second, we prove (i)⇒ (iii)⇒ (i).
[(i) ⇒ (iii)]: Suppose % satisfies the strong homogeneity axiom,
and let w(x) = xa11 · · · · · xann (a1 > 0, a2 > 0, . . . , an >
0, a1 + · · · + an = 1) be the Cobb–Douglas function representing
%′. Define V ∗(p, I) by V ∗(p, I) = logw(d(p, I)) = logw(a1 ·
I/p1, . . . , an ·I/pn) = a1 ·log(a1 ·I/p1)+· · ·+an ·log(an ·I/pn) for all
(p, I) ∈ P×I. Sincew(x) satisfies all the conditions in Lemma3(iii),
it holds by Theorem 2 that V ∗ is an indirect utility function of %.
[(iii) ⇒ (i)]: Let V (p, I) be an indirect utility functions of %, and
suppose there are n + 2 real numbers α0 > 0, α1 < 0, α2 <
0, . . . , αn < 0(Σαi = −α0) and β such that
V (p, I) = α0 · log I + α1 · log p1 + α2 · log p2 + · · ·
+αn · log pn + β for all (p, I) ∈ P× I. (13)
Fix any c≫ 0 and any (x, y) ∈ Y . It holds by Roy’s identity that
d(p, I) = (a1 · I/p1, . . . , an · I/pn)
for all (p, I) ∈ P× I, where ai = αi/Σαi for all i. (14)
Setting q = (a1/x1, . . . , an/xn) and r = (a1/(c1 · x1), . . . , an/(cn ·
xn)), it holds by (14) that
d(q, 1) = x and d(r, 1) = c ∗ x. (15)
Define a sequence {ym} by ym = y + (1/m) · e for all m, which
implies that lim ym = y and ym ≫ 0 for all m. Define a sequence
{qm} by qm = (a1/(y1 + 1/m), . . . , an/(yn + 1/m)), and define a
sequence {rm} by rm = (a1/(c1·y1+c1/m), . . . , an/(cn·yn+cn/m)).
It holds by (14) that d(qm, 1) = ym ≫ 0 and d(rm, 1) = c∗ym ≫ 0
for allm. Hence we have by (13) and (15) that V (rm, 1)−V (r, 1) =
V (qm, 1) − V (q, 1) and (c ∗ x, c ∗ ym) ∼ (x, ym) for all m. Thus it
holds by the continuity axiom that (c ∗ x, c ∗ y) ∼ (x, y). 
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1. If a utility function U representing % satisfies
(3) for some continuously increasing and 1-homogeneous function
u(x), then θ = U(e, . . . , e)−U(1, . . . , 1) = log e+U(1, . . . , 1)−
U(1, . . . , 1) = 1 and U(λ · x) = log u(λ · x) = log(λ · u(x)) =
1 · log λ+ log u(x) = θ · log λ+U(x), which means that U satisfies
(2). Conversely, if a utility function U representing % satisfies (2),
then U satisfies (3), by setting µ = 0 and u(x) = [eU(x)]1/θ for
all x ∈ X . (u(0) = 0, since U(0) = −∞). In fact, u is continuously
increasing and 1-homogeneous, and it holds that θ · log u(x)+µ =
θ · log[eU(x)]1/θ + 0 = θ · (1/θ) · U(x) · log e = U(x) for all x ∈ X .
(θ · log u(0)+ µ = −∞ = U(0)). 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Suppose (z, x) ≻ (z, y), and fix anyw≫ 0.
It holds by the monotonicity axiom that there exists some η > 0
such that (z, y + η · w) ≻ (z, x) ≻ (z, y + 0 · w). Since % is
continuous, we can prove that (z, x) ∼ (z, y + λ · w) for some
λ > 0, using almost the same manner as in Mas-Colell et al.
(1995, Figure 3.C.1, p. 47). (ii) Suppose (z, x) % (z, y), and fix any
w ≫ 0. It holds by Lemma 2(i) that there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
(z, y+λ ·w) ∼ (z, x). Define y∗ = y+λ ·w and define a sequence
{ym} by ym = y∗ + (1/m) · w for all m = 1, 2, . . . . Since ym ≫ y,
it holds by the monotonicity axiom that
(z, ym) ≻ (z, y) and (w, ym) ≻ (w, y) for allm. (16)
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that (z, x + tm · w) ∼ (z, ym), since (z, ym) ≻ (z, y∗) ∼ (z, x).
Define a sequence {xm} by xm = x+ tm ·w for allm. Then it holds
that (z, xm) ∼ (z, ym) for allm, and it holds by xm, ym ≫ 0 and the
consistency axiom that
(w, xm) ∼ (w, ym) for allm. (17)
It holds by (16) and (17) that (w, xm) % (w, y) for all m. Since
lim xm = x, we have by the continuity axiom that (w, x) %
(w, y). (iii) Since % is complete and transitive on Y , it holds
by Lemma 2(ii) that %′ is complete and transitive on X . The
monotonicity and continuity axioms imply the monotonicity and
continuity of %′, respectively. (iv) It holds by (4) and Lemma 2(ii)
that x∼′ y ⇒ [x%′ y and y%′ x] ⇒ [(z, x) % (z, y) and (z, y) %
(z, x) for all z ≫ 0] ⇒ [(z, x) ∼ (z, y) for all z ≫ 0]. Because it
holds by (4) that not y%′ x ⇔ not (z, y) % (z, x) for all z ≫ 0,
it holds by Lemma 2(ii) that x≻′ y ⇒ [x%′ y and not y%′ x] ⇒
[(z, x) % (z, y) and not (z, y) % (z, x) for all z ≫ 0] ⇒ [(z, x) ≻
(z, y) for all z ≫ 0]. (v) Assertion (v) is a direct consequence of
Assertion (i). (vi) It holds by Lemma 2(iv) and the consistency
axiom that x2∼′ y2 ⇒ (x1, x2) ∼ (x1, y2) and that x1∼′ y1 ⇒
(y2+(1/m)·x1, x1) ∼ (y2+(1/m)·x1, y1)⇒ (x1, y2+(1/m)·x1) ∼
(y1, y2 + (1/m) · x1) for all m = 1, 2, . . . . Hence we have by the
continuity axiom that
(x1, x2) ∼ (x1, y2) ∼ (y1, y2). (18)
By almost the samemanner, we can prove that (x3, x4) ∼ (y3, y4).
Hence it holds by (18) that (x1, x2) % (x3, x4) ⇔ (y1, y2) %
(y3, y4). (vii) Suppose 0≻′ x for some x ∈ X . Denoting e ≡
(1, . . . , 1), it holds by Lemma 2(i) that (e, 0) ∼ (e, x + λ · e) for
some λ > 0, which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Suppose x∼′ y and λ · x≻′ λ · y for some
x, y ∈ X and some λ > 0. It holds by Lemma 2(iv) that
(e, x) ∼ (e, y) and (λ · e, λ · x) ≻ (λ · e, λ · y). (19)
It holds by homogeneity axiom that
(e, y) ∼ (λ · e, λ · y) (20)
and
(e, x) ∼ (λ · e, λ · x). (21)
Hence it holds by (19) and (20) that (λ · e, λ · x) ≻ (λ · e, λ · y) ∼
(e, y) ∼ (e, x), which contradicts with (21). Thus x∼′ y ⇒ λ ·
x∼′ λ · y for all x, y ∈ X and all λ > 0.
(ii) It holds by the monotonicity axiom that
λ > µ⇒ (e, λ · e) ≻ (e, µ · e). (22)
This implies that λ ≥ µ ⇒ (e, λ · e) % (e, µ · e). Conversely,
suppose (e, λ · e) % (e, µ · e). If µ > λ, then it holds by (22) that
(e, µ · e) ≻ (e, λ · e). This implies not (e, λ · e) % (e, µ · e), which
is a contradiction. Hence (e, λ · e) % (e, µ · e) ⇒ λ ≥ µ. It holds
by (22) that
(e, λ · e) % (e, µ · e)⇔ λ ≥ µ for all λ,µ ≥ 0. (23)
Next, we prove that (α · e, β · e) % (γ · e, δ · e)⇔ β/α ≥ δ/γ for
all α, β, γ , δ ∈ R+ with α, γ > 0.
Case 1 (β > 0 and δ > 0): It holds by the homogeneity axiom that
(α ·e, β ·e) ∼ (1·e, β/α ·e) and (γ ·e, δ ·e) ∼ (1·e, δ/γ ·e), which
implies that (α·e, β ·e) % (γ ·e, δ·e)⇔ (1·e, β/α·e) % (1·e, δ/γ ·
e). It holds by (23) that (α · e, β · e) % (γ · e, δ · e)⇔ β/α ≥ δ/γ .
Case 2 (β = 0 and δ = 0): It holds that β/α = 0 ≥ δ/γ = 0, and it
holds by the homogeneity axiom that (α ·e, β ·e) = (α ·e, 0 ·e) ∼
(γ · e, 0 · γ /α · e) = (γ · e, 0 · e) = (γ · e, δ · e). Hence
(α · e, β · e) % (γ · e, δ · e).Case 3 (β > 0 and δ = 0): It holds that β/α > δ/γ = 0. It
holds by the homogeneity axiom that (α · e, δ · e) = (α · e, 0) ∼
(γ · e, 0) = (γ · e, δ · e), and it holds by the monotonicity that
(α · e, β · e) ≻ (γ · e, δ · e).
(iii) The existence of a 1-homogeneous utility function u∗ :
X → R representing %′ can be proved by Dow and Werlang
(1992, Proposition 1.5 and Theorem 1.7). Since it holds by the
1-homogeneity of u∗ that u∗(0) = 0, we have u∗(x) ≥ 0 by
Lemma 2(vii). (iv) Let u be a real-valued function on X . If there
exists a > 0 such that u(x) = a · u∗(x) for all x ∈ X , then v
satisfies all the conditions in Lemma 3(iii). Conversely, suppose
that u satisfies all the conditions in Lemma 3(iii). Since u∗(e) >
u∗(0) = 0, and since u(e) > u(0) = 0 by the monotonicity of u,
setting α = u(e)/u∗(e), we have that α > 0 and
u(t, . . . , t) = t · u(e) = t · α · u∗(e) = α · u∗(t, . . . , t)
for all t ≥ 0. (24)
Fix any x ∈ X . It holds by Lemma 2(v, vii) that there is a number
t0 ≥ 0 such that (t0, . . . , t0)∼′ x, which implies that u∗(x) =
u∗(t0, . . . , t0) and u(x) = u(t0, . . . , t0). Thus we have by (24) that
u(x) = u(t0, . . . , t0) = α · u∗(t0, . . . , t0) = α · u∗(x). 
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Suppose x∼′ y and c ∗ x≻′ c ∗ y for some
x, y ∈ X and some c≫ 0. It holds by Lemma 2(iv) that
(e, x) ∼ (e, y) and (c ∗ e, c ∗ x) ≻ (c ∗ e, c ∗ y). (25)
It holds by strong homogeneity axiom that
(e, y) ∼ (c ∗ e, c ∗ y) (26)
and
(e, x) ∼ (c ∗ e, c ∗ x). (27)
Hence it holds by (25) and (26) that (c ∗ e, c ∗ x) ≻ (c ∗ e, c ∗ y) ∼
(e, y) ∼ (e, x), which contradicts with (27). Thus we have that
x∼′ y⇒ c ∗ x∼′ c ∗ y for all x, y ∈ X and all c≫ 0. (28)
Next, we prove the second part. Setting c(t) ≡ (t, 1, . . . , 1), it
suffices to prove that
x≻′ y⇒ c(t) ∗ x%′ c(t) ∗ y for all x, y ∈ X and all t > 0. (29)
Suppose x0≻′ y0 and c(t0)∗y0≻′ c(t)∗x0 for some x0, y0 ∈ X and
some t0 > 0.
Case 1(t0 > 1): Since%′ is monotone and continuous on X , there is
a continuous function u on X such that x%′ y⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y) for all
x, y ∈ X . Define f (t) = u(c(t)∗x0)−u(c(t)∗y0) for all t ∈ [1, t0].
Then it holds that f (1) = u(x0)− u(y0) > 0 and f (t0) = u(c(t0) ∗
x0)−u(c(t0)∗y0) < 0. Since f is continuous on [1, t0], there exists
some t∗ ∈ [1, t0] such that f (t∗) = u(c(t∗)∗x0)−u(c(t∗)∗y0) = 0,
which implies that c(t∗) ∗ x0∼′ c(t∗) ∗ y0. It holds by (28) that
x0 = c(1/t∗) ∗ [c(t∗) ∗ x0] ∼′ c(1/t∗) ∗ [c(t∗) ∗ y0] = y0, which
contradicts with x0≻′ y0. Thus we have that (29) holds.
Case 2(1 > t0 > 0):We can prove (29) by almost the samemanner
as in the proof of Case 1 above.
(ii) It holds by Trockel’s (1989) theorem that there exists
a Cobb–Douglas utility function representing %′. The demand
function can be computed easily. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Define a function f : R → R ∪ {−∞} by
f (t) = g(et) for all t ∈ R. Then it holds that
f (log t) = g(elog t) = g(t) for all t ∈ R++. (30)
It holds by the supposition of Lemma 5 that
logβ − logα = log δ − log γ ⇔ h(β)− h(α) = h(δ)− h(γ )
⇔ g(β)− g(α) = g(δ)− g(γ ) (31)
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ey, γ = ez and δ = ew . Then we have by (30) and (31) that
y− x = w − z ⇔ f (y)− f (x) = f (w)− f (z)
for all x, y, z, w ∈ R. (32)
It holds by the supposition of Lemma 5 that g(β)− g(α) ≥ g(2)−
g(2)⇔ h(β)−h(α) ≥ h(2)−h(2)⇔ logβ−logα ≥ log 2−log 2
for all α, β ∈ R++, which implies that g(β) − g(α) ≥ 0 ⇔
log(β/α) ≥ log 1 and g(β) ≥ g(α) ⇔ β ≥ α. Hence g is
strictly increasing on R++. Since et > 0 is strictly increasing on
R, f (t) = g(et) is strictly increasing on R. It holds by Royden and
Fitzpatrick (2010, Section 6.1, Theorem 1) that there are at most
countable number of points at which f is not continuous, and then
there is a pointλ inR atwhich f is continuous. Letµ be a point inR,
and let {µm} be a convergent sequence inR toµ. Define a sequence
{λm} in R by λm = λ − µ + µm for all m. Hence we have by (32)
that f (λm) − f (λ) = f (µm) − f (m) for all m. Because lim λm = λ
and f is continuous at λ, we have that lim f (µm) = f (µ). Thus we
have that
f (·) is continuous and increasing on R. (33)
Setting a∗ = f (1)− f (0) > 0 and b∗ = f (0), we prove that
f (t) = a∗ · t + b∗ for all rational numbers t in R. (34)
Fix any rational number t inR. There exists a pair of integers (π, θ)
such that
t = θ/π, θ ≥ 0 and π ≠ 0. (35)
Using the induction arguments with respect to q = 0, 1, 2, . . . for
a fixed p ≠ 0, it holds by (32) that
f (q/p) = [f (1/p)− f (0)] · q+ f (0)
for all integers q ≥ 0 and p ≠ 0. (36)
Case 1 (t = θ/π ≥ 0): For each p > 0, setting q = p in (36), we
have that
f (1) = [f (1/p)− f (0)] · p+ f (0) and
f (1/p) = [f (1)− f (0)]/p+ f (0) for all p > 0.
It holds by (36) and this that f (q/p) = (q/p) · [f (1)− f (0)] + f (0)
for all integers q ≥ 0 and p > 0. Since a∗ = f (1) − f (0) and
b∗ = f (0), we have that f (t) = f (θ/π) = a∗ · (θ/π)+ b∗ = a∗ · t
+ b∗.
Case 2 (t = θ/π < 0): For each p < 0, setting q = −p > 0 in (36),
we have that
f (−1) = −[f (1/p)− f (0)] · p+ f (0) and
f (1/p) = [f (0)− f (−1)]/p+ f (0) for all p < 0.
It holds by (36) and this that f (q/p) = (q/p) · [f (0)− f (−1)]+ f (0)
for all integers q > 0 and p < 0. Since f (1)− f (0) = f (0)− f (−1)
by (32), we have that a∗ = f (0) − f (−1) > 0. Hence we have
that
f (t) = f (θ/π) = a∗ · (θ/π)+ b∗ = a∗ · t + b∗.
Thus Assertion (34) holds in the both cases.Because f (t) is continuous on R by (33), we have by (34) that
f (t) = a∗ · t + b∗ for all real numbers t ∈ R, which implies that
f (log t) = a∗ · log t + b∗. Define the two numbers a > 0 and b by
a = a∗/α∗ and b = b∗. Then we have by (30) that
g(t) = a · α∗ · log t + b = a · h(t)+ b for all t ∈ R++. (37)
Since limt→0 log t = log 0 = −∞, it holds by (37) that limt→0 g(t)
= g(0) = −∞, which implies that
g(t) = a · h(t)+ b holds for all t ∈ R+. 
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